Six hours before invading, Hamas terrorists activated Israeli SIM cards in their phones - and Israeli leaders knew

Eliyahu Tulshinski

February 26, 2024

Surprise attack

In what Israelis call a one-day Holocaust, some 1,500 Hamas terrorists, together with approximately the same number of Gazan civilians, invaded Israel at 6:30 a.m. on October 7, 2023. Over 1,200 men, women and children were massacred, many of whom were also raped and mutilated. 253 hostages were taken back to Gaza where those not yet freed continue to undergo rape and torture.

It took the IDF many long hours to respond effectively to the surprise attack, which included paragliders landing some distance from the border and attacking Israeli troops stationed along the fence from behind. Several days passed before Israeli forces regained control over the Gaza periphery area, killing or capturing terrorists who had taken over a number of small communities and even a police station.

Not everyone was surprised

Less than seven hours before the invasion, at around midnight, a number of Israeli intelligence officials alerted their superiors that dozens, if not hundreds, of Gaza-based terrorists had suddenly activated Israeli SIM cards in their phones. The most logical explanation for this was that they were about to enter Israel where they would need the new SIM cards to communicate with each other and report back to Hamas leaders in Gaza.

The Times of Israel reported that the activation of the SIM cards was just one sign among many indicating the possibility of an invasion.

[The IDF and Shin Bet General Security Service] said that in practice, “several indicative signs accumulated, which included, among other things, the activation of . . . dozens of SIMs, which were activated in previous events in the past.

As previously published, on the night of October 7th, indicative signs were received for which situation assessments were conducted and operative decisions were made accordingly.

Israel “lulled” into ignoring warning signs despite receiving Hamas plans to “lull commanders into complacency”

Investigative reporter Caroline Glick reported severe intelligence failures prior to the October invasion, including neglecting to deploy sufficient troops at the Gaza border even after a non-commissioned intelligence officer provided her superiors with evidence of extensive and detailed planning for the invasion. One particular revelation she reported on was that Hamas was planning a number of “dry-runs” in the lead up to the invasion, in the hope that Israel would fail to react when faced with the real thing:

[A] tactical intelligence NCO [non-commissioned officer] and Hamas expert in Unit 8200 with 20 years of experience . . . warned that [Hamas'] intention was to use provocations along the security fence in the weeks leading up to the operation to get the IDF used to breaches and so lull its commanders into complacency.

Of note, the NCO emphasized to her superiors that Hamas intended to increase the frequency of its mock invasions until Israel stopped reacting to the approaches to the Gaza fence, assuming that they were just additional provocations and not preparations for anything serious.

And yet, even after being confronted with evidence that one of Hamas' key tactics was ongoing bluff, senior Israeli officials dismissed the significance of the simultaneous activation of at least dozens of terrorists' SIM cards simply because this had happened before, as reported by Times of Israel:

As the devices with Israeli SIMs had been activated in the past, without anything happening, this led Israeli intelligence officials to believe Hamas could again be carrying out an exercise, and this was not seen as a definitive sign of a planned attack. They decided to continue consultations on the matter throughout the night. [Emphases added.]

Censored till now

Journalists have known that Israeli officials dismissed warnings about the activation of Israeli SIM cards for months, but the information was blocked from publication by Israeli government censors. That all changed when the story was leaked live on air on Israeli television, following which the government allowed it to be reported while issuing a denial that as many as a thousand SIM cards had been activated. However, they did not deny that hundreds of devices had been involved:

The Jerusalem Post has pressed sources on whether the number of Israeli SIM cards activated was dozens or hundreds. Neither side was able to independently verify which.

There were hints that there was more than one round of SIMs being switched on, such that possibly at one stage there were dozens, and at a later stage, hundreds.

For months, the Post and other outlets have known that the IDF and the Shin Bet received signs of danger from Hamas, signs that led to two middle-of-the-night security meetings the night before the invasion, one around midnight, the other at around 3:00 a.m. . .

The SIM story was kept under wraps until Channel 14 revealed the story on Sunday night. The military censor said this was a violation. But once Channel 14 put the information out, media outlets independently confirmed the reports. [Emphases added.]

Keep failure to protect nation secret in order to prevent future failures?

Israeli officials implied that one reason for censoring the story was that it revealed technology used by Israel to monitor Hamas. Together with the Shin Bet General Security Service, the IDF even warned against further reporting on its intelligence failures to avoid exposing “intelligence methods”:

The two bodies also requested that the intelligence methods used by Israel should not be revealed in a way that would harm forces’ continued use of those capabilities, including during the war.

Check back for our continuing coverage of Hamas and Israel as we look at additional intelligence failures and the Israeli officials behind them.